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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
John Curtis May appeals from his conviction for possession of hydrocodone, 
entered upon his conditional guilty plea.  On appeal he challenges the district court’s 
denial of his suppression motion. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court set forth the following findings of fact: 
On June 16, 2015, Detective Matt Love (“Detective Love”) of the 
Minidoka County Sheriff’s Office spoke with Probation and Parole Officer 
Colin Widmier (“Officer Widmier”).  Officer Widmier told Detective Love 
that the Defendant was on parole, that he had absconded, and that there 
was an agent’s warrant for his arrest.  Detective Love did not receive a 
written agent’s warrant for the Defendant’s arrest from any parole officer. 
 
On June 17, 2015, Detective Love and other law enforcement 
officers conducted a probation search of a residence in Minidoka County.  
During the search, the officers found illegal drugs.  As the search 
continued, there was a knock on the front door.  Detective Love opened 
the door and saw the Defendant.  Detective Love recognized the 
Defendant from prior dealings. 
 
Detective Love told the Defendant to turn around.  The Defendant 
turned around and put his hands behind his back.  Detective Love took the 
Defendant’s hands, but the Defendant pulled away and took off running.  
Detective Love yelled at the Defendant to stop and chased after him.  
However, the Defendant refused to stop.  Detective Love eventually 
placed the Defendant on the ground in the middle of the street. 
 
While the Defendant was on the ground, he struggled with 
Detective Love.  Detective Love saw the Defendant trying to eat pills 
obtained from his pocket.  The pills were on the ground and coming out of 
the Defendant’s mouth.  After securing the Defendant in handcuffs, law 
enforcement officers found a pill bottle on the Defendant’s person. 
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(R., pp.68-69.) 
The state charged May as a persistent violator with possession of hydrocodone 
with the intent to deliver; possession of oxycodone with the intent to deliver; and 
resisting and obstructing an officer.  (R., pp.34-40.)  May filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence found on his person, arguing that his arrest was unlawful because it did not 
comply with Idaho Code § 20-227, and so violated his constitutional rights.  (R., p.30.)  
After holding a hearing on the motion (See 10/19/2015 Tr.), the district court denied 
May’s suppression motion (R., pp.68-71). 
Reserving his right to appeal from the district court’s denial of his suppression 
motion, May entered into a conditional plea agreement with the state pursuant to which 
May pleaded guilty to possession of hydrocodone and the state dismissed the 
remaining charges.  (R., pp.77-80, 89-90, 100.)  The district court entered judgment 
against May and sentenced him to a unified term of five years with one and a half years 
fixed.  (R., pp.104-06.)  May filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.108-09.) 
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ISSUE 
May states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Did the district court err when it denied Mr. May’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
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ARGUMENT 
May Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
 
A. Introduction 
In his motion to suppress below, clarified at the suppression hearing, May argued 
that his arrest violated Idaho Code § 20-227, and that the statutory violation in turn 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  (R., p.30; 10/19/2015 Tr., p.5, L.16 – p.6, L.18.)  
The district court directly addressed this argument in its order denying May’s 
suppression motion and concluded that the technical violation of Idaho Code § 20-227 
did not violate May’s constitutional rights, and May was therefore not entitled to 
suppression for the statutory violation.  (R., pp.68-71.)  On appeal, “May does not 
contest the district court’s conclusion that he was arrested in violation of Idaho Code 
§ 20-227, but that suppression is not the appropriate remedy for a violation of § 20-227.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)  Instead, “May … contends that the district court erred in failing 
to suppress the evidence found on his person because he was seized and searched in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”  (Id.)  May’s 
argument fails.  First, he failed to preserve for appellate review a standalone claim that 
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.  Second, even considering the Fourth 
Amendment claim on its merits, May has failed to show any violation of his 
constitutional rights.  The search and seizure were valid and the district court correctly 
denied May’s suppression motion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s 
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findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 
843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004). 
 
C. May Failed To Preserve For Appellate Review His Standalone Claim That His 
Fourth Amendment Rights Were Violated 
 
In his appellant’s brief, May claims that “[a]t the suppression hearing, counsel for 
Mr. May stated he sought to suppress the pills found on Mr. May’s person and made an 
argument under § 20-227 and under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.2.)  May’s contention is not supported by the 
transcript of the hearing.  Defense counsel argued that officers violated May’s Fourth 
Amendment rights because they violated Idaho Code § 20-227 when they arrested him 
and, he claimed, that statute was the only authority for seizing May.  (10/19/2015 Tr., 
p.5, L.18 – p.6, L.18.)  May’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated was 
always tied to his claim that the statute was violated. 
“Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that 
were presented below.”  Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 
(2007); see also State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 367, 347 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Ct. App. 
2015).  “Issues not raised below generally may not be considered for the first time on 
appeal.”  Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 367, 347 P.3d at 1028 (citing State v. Fodge, 121 
Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992)).  “For an objection to be preserved for 
appellate review, either the specific ground for the objection must be clearly stated or 
the basis of the objection must be apparent from the context.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
As recognized by the district court, May’s motion raised the narrow issue of whether 
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suppression of evidence was the correct remedy for noncompliance with Idaho Code 
§ 20-227.  (R., p.69.)  Having failed to raise an independent Fourth Amendment claim 
before the district court, May has failed to preserve this issue for review. 
Moreover, to preserve an issue for appellate review, the appellant must receive 
an adverse ruling from the trial court on which to base an assignment of error.  See 
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 442, 180 P.3d 476, 481 (2008) (“This Court will not 
review a trial court’s alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse 
ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of error.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
Even had May presented a standalone Fourth Amendment claim, he certainly did not 
receive a ruling on that issue—which May does not contest; in fact, May acknowledges 
that “the district court did not make any findings or conclusions regarding reasonable 
suspicion or Mr. May’s apparent Fourth Amendment waiver.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) 
Because May failed to present a standalone Fourth Amendment claim below, 
instead presenting the narrow issue of whether a statutory noncompliant arrest required 
suppression of evidence, appellate review is limited to that argument and May has failed 
to show any error in the district court’s resolving of that narrow issue.  Even had May 
raised a standalone Fourth Amendment claim, as May points out on appeal, the district 
court never addressed such a claim.  Either way, this issue is unpreserved and should 
not be addressed on appeal. 
 
D. On The Merits, May’s Fourth Amendment Rights Were Not Violated 
Even if May had preserved his standalone claim that his Fourth Amendment 
rights were somehow violated by his arrest and subsequent search, that claim would fail 
on its merits.  First, May voluntarily waived his Fourth Amendment rights as an express 
 
  7 
condition of his probation; therefore, May had no Fourth Amendment rights that could 
be violated by his arrest and subsequent search.  Second, even ignoring May’s waiver, 
his search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted incident to a 
lawful arrest. 
 
1. May’s Voluntary Waiver Of His Fourth Amendment Right To Be Free From 
Warrantless Searches Validates The Warrantless Search 
 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
Warrantless searches are generally considered unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”  Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  One exception to the warrant requirement is a search done 
pursuant to consent.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations 
omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003).  Freely and 
voluntarily given consent validates a search.  Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222 (citations 
omitted).  When a probationer or parolee, as an express term of his release, has waived 
his right to be free from a warrantless search, such warrantless searches are valid.  
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 209, 207 P.3d 182, 185 (2009) (citing State v. Gawron, 
112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987)).   
At the suppression hearing May’s parole officer testified that, as an express 
condition of his parole, May waived his Fourth Amendment rights.  (10/19/2015 Tr., 
p.26, L.15 – p.27, L.12.)  Those Fourth Amendment waivers were presented in court 
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and copies, made by the court during the hearing (id., p.27, Ls.16-23), were entered into 
evidence (id., p.35, L.18 – p.36, L.7; see also State’s Exs. 1 and 2).  The waiver 
regarding searches stated: 
The parolee shall consent to the search of his/her person, residence, 
vehicle, personal property, and other real property or structures owned or 
leased by the parolee or for which the parolee is the controlling authority 
conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction or other law 
enforcement officer.  The parolee waives his/her Fourth Amendment 
Rights concerning searches. 
 
(See State’s Exs. 1 and 2.)  Because May consented to a “search of his … person … by 
any … law enforcement officer” and waived his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
warrantless searches, the warrantless search in this case, which was conducted by a 
law enforcement officer, was valid. 
 
2. May’s Warrantless Search Was Valid Because It Was Incident To His 
Lawful Arrest 
 
Even if there had been no Fourth Amendment waiver present in this case—which 
there was—May’s search would still be valid because it was incident to a lawful arrest.  
A search incident to lawful arrest is another exception to the warrant requirement.  
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).  Warrantless arrests based on 
probable cause are lawful under the Fourth Amendment.  Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 
164, 171 (2008); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003); I.C. § 19-603.  
Probable cause is “the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary 
care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such 
person is guilty.”  State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996) 
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(citation omitted).  In determining whether the State has met the standard of probable 
cause, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances.  Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371. 
May’s arrest was valid on at least three grounds:  First, Detective Love had 
probable cause that May had absconded parole.  Second, in the presence of Detective 
Love, May committed the crime of resisting and obstructing an officer.  Third, the 
detective discovered, in plain view, pills on May’s person.   
In this case, Parole Officer Widmier informed Detective Love that May had 
absconded parole and there was an agent’s warrant out for his arrest.  (R., pp.68-69; 
10/19/2015 Tr., p.10, L.6 – p.11, L.5.)  Idaho Code § 20-227 authorizes any parole 
officer to arrest a parolee without a warrant, and to deputize other officers to arrest the 
parolee, when that parolee violates his parole.  Deputation requires a written statement 
(agent’s warrant), I.C. § 20-227(1), which did not occur in this case.  But as the district 
court concluded, and May concedes on appeal, such statutory noncompliance does not 
violate the Constitution.  (R., pp.69-71; Appellant’s brief, p.6.)  Because Detective Love 
had probable cause to arrest May, due to his violating parole by absconding, the arrest 
was constitutionally valid and the search incident to that arrest was lawful.  See State v. 
Green, 158 Idaho 884, 354 P.3d 446 (2015). 
Even if Detective Love could not lawfully arrest May on the parole violation, he 
could still lawfully arrest May for resisting and obstructing the officer.  Idaho Code § 18-
705 criminalizes the act of willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer in his 
duties.  When Detective Love attempted to detain May, May broke away from the officer 
and fled.  (R., p.69; 10/19/2015 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-25.)  By so doing, May committed the 
crime of resisting and obstructing the officer in fulfilling his duties. 
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Detective Love’s detention of May was lawful on two bases:  First, if the officer 
could not lawfully arrest May on the parole violation, then he could at least detain him 
on reasonable suspicion of the violation.  Investigative detentions are permissible on 
reasonable suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged 
in criminal activity.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411, 417 (1981).  Reasonable suspicion may be supplied by an informant’s tip or a 
citizen’s report of suspected criminal activity.  State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101, 15 
P.3d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2000).  “Whether information from such a source is sufficient to 
create reasonable suspicion depends upon the content and reliability of the information 
presented by the source, including whether the informant reveals her identity and the 
basis of her knowledge.”  Id. (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972)).  
Officer Widmier’s informing Detective Love that May had absconded from parole, 
though not statutorily sufficient to deputize the detective under Idaho Code § 20-227, 
still constituted a tip from an identifiable and reliable source.  Detective Love therefore 
had sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain May. 
Second, officers were conducting a probation search of the residence when May 
arrived at the residence, and so could detain him for being on the premises during the 
search.  See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (when law enforcement 
officers are executing a search warrant on a premises, they may briefly detain 
occupants of the premises); State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296, 299-300, 47 P.3d 1266, 
1270-71 (Ct. App. 2002) (persons who arrive at the premises during a search may be 
detained for the time necessary to determine identity and any connection to the 
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premises).  Though Idaho appellate courts have specifically not decided whether the 
Summers rule should be extended to individuals found on the premises of a lawful 
probation search, see State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 916, 155 P.3d 712, 717 (Ct. 
App. 2007), courts that have addressed the issue have extended the rule, see, e.g., 
People v. Matelski, 82 Cal. App. 4th 837, 851-52, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543, 552-53 (2000). 
At least in the case of parolees, this Court should extend the Summers rule to 
allow police to detain parolees found on the premises during a lawful probation search.  
“[P]arolees have severely diminished privacy expectations by virtue of their status 
alone.”  Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006).  Intrusions by government 
authorities which may otherwise be invalid are rendered reasonable by parolees’ and 
probationers’ reduced expectation of privacy.  State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 
P.3d 182 (2009).  At a minimum, because of May’s status as a parolee, officers were 
justified in detaining him to determine his connection to the premises. 
Because officers could lawfully detain May, either on the basis of the tip from 
Officer Widmier or because May arrived during the lawful probation search of the 
residence, May violated the law when he willfully resisted, delayed, and obstructed 
Detective Love in his attempt to detain May.  Detective Love had probable cause to 
arrest May, and the search incident to that arrest was lawful. 
Finally, even if Detective Love had not received information from Officer Widmier, 
and even if his attempt to detain May was not within the scope permitted by Summers 
and its progeny, Detective Love still had reasonable suspicion to detain May because of 
his flight from law enforcement.  See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) 
(“Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion:  It is not 
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necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”).  Upon 
detaining May, Detective Love observed May attempting to consume pills.  (R., p.69; 
10/19/2015 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-14.)  Seeing May possess the contraband gave the officer 
sufficient probable cause to lawfully arrest him.  The search incident to that lawful arrest 
was therefore valid. 
May’s arrest was lawful, whether because officers knew that he was an 
absconded parolee; or because he resisted and obstructed officers when they lawfully 
attempted to detain him; or because officers viewed, in plain sight, pills on his person.  
Because his arrest was lawful, the search incident to that arrest was valid under the 
Fourth Amendment.  May’s argument that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated is 
without merit.  The district court correctly denied his motion to suppress.  The district 
court should be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order 
denying May’s suppression motion. 
 DATED this 2nd day of September, 2016. 
 
 
      /s/ Russell J. Spencer___________________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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